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Abstract
Over the past few years, Presentation Attack Detection
(PAD) has become a fundamental part of facial recogni-
tion systems. Although much effort has been devoted to
anti-spoofing research, generalization in real scenarios re-
mains a challenge. In this paper we present a new open-
source evaluation framework to study the generalization ca-
pacity of face PAD methods, coined here as face-GPAD.
This framework facilitates the creation of new protocols fo-
cused on the generalization problem establishing fair pro-
cedures of evaluation and comparison between PAD solu-
tions. We also introduce a large aggregated and catego-
rized dataset to address the problem of incompatibility be-
tween publicly available datasets. Finally, we propose a
benchmark adding two novel evaluation protocols: one for
measuring the effect introduced by the variations in face
resolution, and the second for evaluating the influence of
adversarial operating conditions.
1. Introduction
Face recognition based systems have become very at-
tractive solutions for a wide variety of applications. The
presentation of the iPhone X in 2017 with its face verifica-
tion system (the FaceID) puts this technology in the spot-
light as a strong candidate to substitute the fingerprint veri-
fication, not only to unlock the device but also as a mobile
authentication mechanism.Furthermore, these systems are
increasingly used in several applications as border controls,
accesses to events or even for on-boarding processes. How-
ever, there remain two major challenges for the inclusion
of these kind of systems in a larger number of applications:
the Presentation Attacks (PAs) and their generalization ca-
pability.
The development of Presentation Attack Detection
(PAD) solutions is a must, to guarantee the security of the
users. Early adopters of face recognition (FR) systems have
historically chosen active face-PAD approaches in order to
preserve their security. This challenge-response strategy re-
quires to mimic certain actions (e.g. eye blinking, smil-
ing, head motion) increasing its robustness to attacks based
on photographs or videos. However, latest advances in
computer graphics [12, 15] threaten even this collaborative
countermeasure. On the other hand, passive face-PAD is a
more convenient and non-intrusive approach, but also en-
tailing a far more challenging scenario. Relying on addi-
tional sensors such as 3D/IR/thermal cameras is an easy op-
tion, but it restricts the use case to a few specialized devices,
dramatically incrementing costs. For the sake of accessibil-
ity and costs, we focus on the ubiquitous 2D-camera case,
available in almost all mobile devices.
On the other hand, we find the generalization problem.
After a first stage of enthusiasm among the research com-
munity, with PAD solutions that offer very low error rates
in the available datasets, it comes a stage of disappointment
when the same approaches are not able to work in more
real environments. For instance, cross-evaluations between
datasets quickly began to be included in the publications
[9] in order to reveal a great problem: methods evaluated
in a dataset other than training increase error rates by an
order of magnitude. However, there is no common evalua-
tion framework for conducting such cross-evaluation exper-
iments in a consistent and comparable manner across pub-
lications. Therefore, addressing the generalization problem
is critical.
We believe that generalization in face-PAD is in an early
research stage and it is time to unify the criteria in order to
perform fair evaluations. Thus, in this paper we propose to
establish a new topic within the anti-spoofing research that
deals with the generalization issues within face-PAD meth-
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ods. We call this problem Generalized Presentation Attack
Detection (GPAD).
We propose to analyze the status quo of the face anti-
spoofing research with a proposal centered around the
GPAD problem. The main contributions of this work in-
clude:
• We provide the largest aggregated dataset with a com-
mon categorization in two levels to represent four key
aspects in anti-spoofing: attacks, lighting, capture de-
vices and resolution.
• We release an open-source evaluation framework∗, in-
troducing an unified benchmark for GPAD.
• We provide an evaluation of state-of-the-art methods in
the proposed benchmark. We demonstrate the limita-
tion of current dataset evaluation procedures (general-
ization, cross-domain evaluation, etc.), while showing
the benefits of the proposed unified framework. All the
experiments will be reproducible.
• Using the novel evaluation tool, we introduce two
novel protocols for the GPAD problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides a brief overview of the challenges in the field
of generalization for anti-spoofing systems. The proposed
framework and the description of the Aggregated-Datasets
are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss in detail
the proposed evaluation protocols and results. Conclusions
are presented in Section 5.
2. Related Work
As [4] already points out, there is no unified taxonomy
for the diverse set of attacks, nor for a unified criteria for the
evaluation protocols or the metrics used to fairly assess the
performance of face-PAD systems, specially when dealing
with the generalization problem. We compliment the taxon-
omy initiated in [4] to fully categorize the current status of
face-PAD approaches from different perspectives.
Current face-PAD methods can be classified regarding
the following standpoints: i) from the hardware used for
data acquisition as rgb-only [11, 21, 26] or additional sen-
sors [2, 23] approaches; ii) from the required user interac-
tion as active [14] or passive [16, 26] methods; iii) from
the input data type as single-frame [26] or video-based
[1, 22] approaches; iv) and, finally, depending on the fea-
ture extraction and classification strategy as hand-crafted
[4, 26] or deep learning [13, 16]. Based on these classifi-
cations, we can depict that the most challenging scenario
occurs when data is captured using rgb-only sensors us-
ing passive approaches that avoid any challenge-response
interaction with the user (e.g. smiling or blinking) that in-
creases drastically the usability of face-PAD systems. The
∗https://github.com/Gradiant/bob.paper.icb2019.gradgpad
most recent and successful methods [13, 17, 25] show that
video-based solutions incorporate more meaningful infor-
mation compared with those based on single frames, adopt-
ing the former as the main research direction. Finally, de-
spite that many recent models attempt to detect face live-
ness, building upon representation based hand-crafted fea-
tures [11, 19, 24], obtaining good results for intra-dataset
protocols, the increasing interest on the topic has led to
the appearance of new datasets [13, 17, 30], turning deep
learning methods as a solid alternative adopted by almost
every recent approach [13, 16, 17, 20, 30]. Considering
the aforementioned challenging setting (rgb-only, passive,
video-based and deep learning), these methods leverage re-
cent advances on deep metric learning to extract highly dis-
criminative features from image sequences, achieving state-
of-the-art results for intra-dataset setups, especially when
using auxiliary supervision based on depth reconstruction
[13, 16]. Despite training data is not enough, this setting
has been established as the right direction to discover the
complex patterns and details that appear in any spoofing at-
tempt.
2.1. Generalized Presentation Attack Detection
Current state-of-the-art solutions suffer a severe drop of
performance during testing in realistic scenarios because
they exhibit a sort of overfitting behavior maximizing the
results for intra-dataset experimental setups. This fact has
made that each approach proposes its own evaluation pro-
tocols and metrics, giving place to a missing unified criteria
to evaluate generalization.
Generalization has been specifically addressed with no
success from different perspectives: i) applying domain
adaptation techniques [17]; ii) reformulating the problem
as an anomaly detection [21] scenario; iii) learning general-
ized deep features [13, 16, 17]; or even iv) using generative
models [13]. Besides, there is still a lack of unified bench-
mark and representative datasets, that might mitigate the
constant improvement of Presentation Attack Instruments
(PAIs) with more sophisticated strategies (e.g. 3D render-
ing) and newly unseen attack instruments (e.g. professional
make-up). Regardless almost every proposal comes with its
own reduced dataset [13, 17, 20, 30], there is no agreement
upon a PAD benchmark, and generalization properties are
not properly evaluated.
2.2. Datasets
During a brief inspection of the capture settings of video-
based face-PAD datasets (see Table 1), one can easily ob-
serve that there is no unified criteria in the goals of each
of them, leading to a manifest built-in bias. This speci-
ficity in the domain covered by most of the datasets can
be observed in different scenarios: i) some of them focus
on a single type of attack (e.g masks - 3DMAD, HKBU,
CSMAD), ii) others focus on the study of different image
sources (depth/NIR/thermal) such as CASIA-SURF or CS-
MAD, iii) others attempt to simulate a certain scenario like
a mobile device setting, where the user hold the device (e.g.
Replay-Mobile, OULU-NPU), or a webcam setting, where
user is placed in front of fixed camera (e.g Replay-Attack,
SiW), or even a stand-up scenario where users are recorded
further from the camera (e.g UVAD), etc.
Beyond classical intra-dataset evaluation where state-of-
the-art algorithms work really well, most of them also pro-
pose to assess generalization properties using a direct eval-
uation between different datasets (i.e. inter-dataset proto-
cols). The most recent publications go a step further by
proposing aggregated datasets such as [21] and [27]. The
underlying idea is to generate a combined dataset that rep-
resents the anti-spoofing scenario in a richer way, increasing
the diversity of the data, e.g. with a larger number of users,
capture devices and PAIs.
It seems clear that the community has become aware of
the importance of data representativeness in our topic and
more and more publications are proposing new databases
or different combinations of inter-dataset evaluations.
2.3. Challenges
Despite the effort of the research community, there is no
standard methodology to evaluate the different approaches
in a cross-dataset scenario, which motivates each publica-
tion to propose a new method with a different dataset. This
makes it impossible to perform a more in-depth analysis of
anti-spoofing algorithms, since by keeping the global re-
sults of a dataset, we are masking many variables. Thus,
some questions quickly arise. Are our algorithms working
badly for an specific type of attack, capture device or res-
olution?, or is it really just one of those hidden parameters
that is causing that the performance drops drastically? It is
obvious that there is a big challenge under the generaliza-
tion problem and we need to unmask it in detail if we aim
at giving a big step towards a general solution. We propose
to emphasize the importance of data and to unify the pro-
cedure to evaluate face anti-spoofing systems in the most
challenging scenario: the generalization problem.
3. The Evaluation Framework
In this paper, we present a novel evaluation frame-
work to help the research community to address the prob-
lem of generalization in face-PAD. Our framework is pub-
licly available as a Python package under the acronym
GRAD-GPAD (Generalization Representation over Aggre-
gated Datasets for Generalized Presentation Attack Detec-
tion). This framework provides a common taxonomy of ex-
isting datasets and allows to evaluate face-PAD algorithms
from additional points of view, revealing new interesting
properties. The GRAD-GPAD framework is extendable and
Figure 1: Overview of GRAD-GPAD evaluation framework
scalable by design. This will help researchers to create new
protocols, to define categorizations over different datasets in
order to make them compatible, and to enable the addition
of new datasets.
The GRAD-GPAD framework has a top-down design
and provides a very convenient level of abstraction. Figure
1 shows the proposed dataset evaluation pipeline, where cir-
cles with dotted lines represent the customizable and easy-
to-extend elements. Each of these elements in the frame-
work follows a specific interface to work properly. Thus,
we can add, for instance, a new Dataset (e.g. using some
videos recorded for an specific use case), or a new imple-
mentation of a Feature Extractor to evaluate an algorithm
or even create an ad-hoc Protocol.
GRAD-GPAD presents two main stages: i) feature ex-
traction, where features are computed for each input video
applying a preprocessing step and following the interface of
the Feature Extractor; and ii) evaluation, where a filtering
step is applied, using the already extracted features and the
common categorization of the datasets, to train and test over
the selected features.
3.1. The Aggregated Dataset
We propose a novel paradigm of data collection where
new datasets are aggregated in a larger dataset, following a
global categorization to make the involved datasets compat-
ible. We show that our framework can be used to replicate
and extend the analysis of state-of-the-art protocols, as well
as to obtain a fair analysis of the algorithms using novel
protocols.
As we already pointed out in Section 2, current pub-
licly available datasets for face anti-spoofing are very het-
erogeneous. The variability of the spoofing attacks and
capture/display devices makes the problem actually un-
constrained and dynamic. Moreover, existing datasets
present different labeling, protocols and data splits. The
GRAD-GPAD framework simplifies such a dynamic struc-
ture thanks to its scalable nature and only requires the data
to be split into three subsets in order to evaluate face-PAD
Dataset Year
Num
Identities
Number samples
real/ attack
Spoof
attacks
Capture
Devices
Modal
types
Display
Devices
Pose
Range
Different
Expression
Additional
Lightning
CASIA-FASD [31] 2012 50 150/450
Print,
Replay
low-quality webcam,
medium-quality webcam, Sony NEX-5 RGB iPad Frontal No No
REPLAY-ATTACK [6] 2012 50 200/1000 Print, 2 Replay macbook webcam RGB iPhone 3GS, iPad Frontal No Yes
3DMAD [10] 2013 17 170/85 Mask (rigid) Microsoft Kinect RGB/Depth - Frontal No No
MSU-MFSD [26] 2015 35 110/330 Print, 2 Replay macbook air webcam, nexus 5 RGB iPad Air, iPhone 5S Frontal No No
UVAD [22] 2015 404 808/16268 7 Replay
cybershot dsc-hx1, canon powershot sx1,
nikon coolpix p100, kodak z981,
olympus sp 800UZ, panasonic fz35 digital
RGB
7 different
unknown monitors Frontal No No
REPLAY-MOBILE [7] 2016 40 390/640 Print, Replay iPad Mini 2, LG G4 RGB Philips 227ELH Frontal No Yes
HKBU [18] (v1) 2016 8 70/40 Mask (rigid) Logitech C9200 webcam RGB - Frontal No No
OULU-NPU [5] 2017 55 1980/3960
2 Print,
2 Replay
Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge, htc desire eye,
meizu x5, asus xenfone, sony xperia c5, oppo n3 RGB
Dell1905FP,
MacBook Retina Frontal No Yes
SMAD [20] 2017 - 65/65 Mask (silicone) - RGB - - - -
ROSE-YOUTU [17] 2018 20 3350
2 Print, 2 Replay,
2 Mask (Paper) hasee, huawei, ipad 4, iphone 5s, zte RGB
Lenovo LCD display,
Mac LCD display Frontal Yes No
SIW [13] 2018 165 1320/330
2 Print,
4 Replay canon eos t6, logitech c920 webcam RGB
iPad Pro, iPhone7
Galaxy S8, Asus MB168B [-90, 90] Yes Yes
CS-MAD [2] 2018 14 88/220
Print,Mask
(silicone)
Intel Realsense SR300 (full HD),
Nikon Coolpix P520 (still images)
RGB/Depth
IR/Thermal - Frontal No Yes
CASIA-SURF [30] 2019 1000 3500/17500
Print, Mask
(paper, cut) Intel RealSense
RGB/Depth
IR -
[-30, 30]
(attacks) No No
Table 1: List of existing databases for anti-spoofing based on videos and their main characteristics.
algorithms: a training set to find the classification model,
the development set to estimate the threshold that provides
Equal Error Rate (EER) performance, and a test set that is
used to report the final results using fair metrics for the gen-
eralization problem that has been recently standardized in
the ISO/IEC 30107-3 ∗: i.e. HTER (Half Total Error Rate),
ACER (Average Classification Error Rate), APCER (Attack
Presentation Classification Error Rate) and BPCER (Bona
fide Presentation Classification Error Rate). Some datasets
(e.g. Replay-Attack [6], 3DMAD [10], Replay-Mobile [7],
HKBU [18], OULU-NPU [5]) are already divided that way,
others, however, need to be restructured. Based on the work
of Pinto et al. in [22], we have split CASIA-FASD [31],
Rose-Youtu [17] and SiW [13], keeping the test subset un-
modified and splitting the original training set in a training
subset comprising 80% of the users and a development sub-
set comprising the remaining 20%. Furthermore, CS-MAD
[2] does not contain explicit subsets, so we randomly par-
titioned the data into the mentioned subsets (40% in Train,
30% in Dev and 30% in Test) from the users’ identities. Fi-
nally MSU-MFSD [26] is originally divided in two folds,
nevertheless we re-divided it based on this Python pack-
age†. At the moment of writing this paper, ten out of the
thirteen datasets shown in Table 1 have been integrated in
our framework. Work is currently underway to add both
SMAD [10] and UVAD [22], as well as the recently intro-
duced CASIA-SURF [29].
3.2. Categorization
Although some of the datasets share a common nota-
tion, there is no common taxonomy, so we can catego-
rize the different types of accesses represented in current
datasets. Each of these datasets has useful categories and
labels that help researchers for a better understanding of
their algorithms. However, the amount of data is usually
∗https://www.iso.org/standard/67381.html
†https://gitlab.idiap.ch/bob/bob.db.msu mfsd mod
not enough to train the algorithms properly, so they can-
not be effectively used. In this paper, we propose an up-
dated inter-dataset categorization based on four general cat-
egories: common PAI, common capture device, common
lighting and common face resolution. Table 2 and the next
paragraphs present, in more detail, each of the proposed cat-
egories, as well as their subclasses (type and subtype).
Category Types Sub-type Criteria
Common PAI
print
low dpi≤ 600
medium 600< dpi≤ 1000
high dpi> 1000
replay
low res≤ 480 pix
medium 480< res< 1080 pix
high res≥ 1080 pix
mask
paper paper masks
rigid non-flexible plaster-like
silicone silicone masks
Common Capture Devices
webcam low SD reshigh HD res
mobile/tablet low SD reshigh HD res
digital camera low SD reshigh HD res
Common Face Resolution
small face - IOD≤ 120 pix
medium face - 120< IOD≤ 240 pix
large face - IOD> 240 pix
Common Lighting
controlled - -
adverse - -
no info - -
Table 2: Inter-Dataset common categorization.
1. Common PAI. So far, every existing dataset have in com-
mon that the PAI used in each attack is precisely la-
beled. In this work, we also propose an additional sub-
categorization in three subtypes based on both quality
and material criteria. Print attacks are categorized as: 1)
low quality, if the attacks were performed with an image
printed on a printer with less than 600dpi (dots per inch),
2) high, if the printer exceeds 1000dpi, and 3) medium
for the remaining range. The resolution of the screen is
used to sub-categorize the Replay attacks as follows: 1)
high, if the attacks are performed replaying a video or a
photo on a screen with a resolution higher than 1080pix,
2) low, if it is performed on screens with lower resolution
than 480pix, and 3) medium, as in the previous case, for
the remaining range. In the case of mask-type attacks, the
categorization is more subjective, so it has been divided
on the basis of the material used in each of the masks as:
1) paper, 2) non-flexible plaster-like and 3) silicone.
2. Common capture devices. Production ready systems that
are currently working in the real world have been devel-
oped for specific hardware, being able to adjust the pa-
rameters to a specific scenario. However, all state-of-
the-art systems suffer a dramatic performance loss when
they are evaluated in inter-dataset protocols with no rea-
soning about the parameters involved. GRAD-GPAD al-
lows, in much more detail, an analysis of the influence of
these parameters, e.g. the capture devices. Three differ-
ent types have been added: 1) webcams, 2) mobile/tablet
and 3) digital cameras. Additionally, they can be divided
by the resolution of their sensors as: high-definition (HD)
or standard-definition (SD).
3. Common lighting. Features extracted from color and tex-
ture information (crucial in most of current face-PAD
methods) are highly influenced by the varying lighting
conditions. However, their influence in face-PAD gen-
eralization has not been studied properly. In the proposed
categorization, we have collected all the information re-
lated to lighting. We have found 3 novel divisions: 1)
controlled, 2) adverse and 3) no-info. Videos with no in-
formation about the lighting have been categorized as no
info, waiting for a future categorization.
4. Common Face Resolution: Texture-based methods suffer
from different face resolutions. Thus, we propose a in-
ner division in three types: 1) small, 2) medium and 3)
large faces. The applied criterion has been extracted from
the ISO/IEC 29794-5:2010 ∗ recommendations, applying
thresholds to the Interocular Distance (IOD). Eyes land-
marks have been extracted with [28] for all the frames
available on the aggregated dataset, and the categoriza-
tion has been made for each video, based on an average
of the inter eyes distances of the frames.
3.3. Protocols
The GRAD-GPAD framework allows, using configura-
tion files, a simple filtering of data to create our own pro-
tocols. We can determine for each of the subsets of the ag-
gregated dataset (Train, Dev and Test) which dataset and
subsets are used in the experiment, and filter depending on
the common categories selected.
Furthermore, the framework also offers some protocols
that have been already proposed in the literature to bench-
mark the anti-spoofing algorithms. The default protocols
are the following:
1. Grandtest: a protocol that evaluates face-PAD algo-
rithms without any filter. All sets include all the previous
categories.
∗https://www.iso.org/standard/50912.html
2. Cross-Dataset: this is the most common protocol used to
assess generalization of face-PAD algorithms. It is based
on training on one or several datasets and testing in others.
3. One-PAI: a protocol that evaluates face-PAD algorithms
filtering only by PAI. This protocol is useful to evaluate
systems that are focused on the detection of only one kind
of PAI.
4. Unseen Attacks (Cross-PAI): a protocol that evaluates
the performance under unseen PAI. In the training and dev
stage a PAI is excluded, which is then used for testing.
5. Unseen Capture Devices: protocols that evaluate how
a face-PAD algorithm works under capture devices that
were excluded on training and dev stages.
Despite these protocols already appeared in the litera-
ture, the proposed categorization and the aggregated dataset
allow a better representation of the anti-spoofing scenario
(more examples of different devices, attacks, conditions,
etc.). That way, these protocols can extract finer informa-
tion from the methods under evaluation. Additionally, we
propose in this work two novel protocols that evaluate pa-
rameters of great relevance in the generalization to real en-
vironments.
1. Cross-FaceResolution. Building on top of some papers
[4] that mention the influence of the distance between
camera and subject, we propose a protocol to focus the
analysis on the role of resolution of the region of the
face in the task of detecting fake attempts. Two vari-
ants are possible for this protocol. The first one, Cross-
FaceResolution-LF-Test, uses small and medium faces
(determined by the resolution) for training, while using
high resolution faces (LF - Large Faces) for testing. The
second, Cross-FaceResolution-SF-Test, represents the op-
posed setup: it uses large and medium faces samples on
training and small faces (SF) for testing.
2. Cross-Conditions. The underlying idea is to assess the
performance of the anti-spoofing algorithms under ad-
versarial conditions. Two variants are proposed: Cross-
Conditions-Test-Adverse, where we evaluate the perfor-
mance of the system when training on optimal conditions
(high quality capture devices, low and medium quality
PAIs, paper masks and both controlled and no info light-
ing conditions) and testing on adverse conditions (low
quality capture devices, high quality PAIs, silicon and
non-flexible plaster-like mask, and adverse lighting con-
ditions); and Cross-Conditions-Test-Optimal, where we
do the opposite.
4. Experiments
In this section we present the results of the experiments
for the proposed benchmark. The GRAD-GPAD framework
is used to extract the features, using two well-known face-
PAD methods. We then train the models and filter the cate-
gories in order to evaluate several protocols for the proposed
aggregated dataset.
4.1. Face-PAD methods
Two recent and popular approaches have been selected
to guide the explanation of the proposed protocols, which
will also serve as a baseline for the aggregated dataset:
1) the Color-based face-PAD proposed in [3], and 2) the
Quality-Based method proposed in [21] based on a concate-
nation of quality measures (IQM) introduced in [11] and
[26]. The code for these algorithms is publicly available in
the GRAD-PAD framework based on the reproducible ma-
terial∗† shared by the authors.
Since we want to compare systems using the same con-
ditions, we fix the video preprocessing and the classification
stage for both algorithms. Following the recommendations
given in [8], the experiments have been designed trying to
simulate a real scenario and considering usability as a key
aspect of the systems.
For face detection we use the method proposed in [28].
Faces are cropped and rescaled to 64 x 64 pixels. This
cropped image is the input for the method under evaluation.
In the case of the Quality-Based algorithm, we obtain for
every image a 139-length feature vector from the concate-
nation of the quality measurements proposed in [11, 26].
On the other hand, the Color-Based face-PAD computes
for each image a vector of a much larger dimensionality
(19998-length feature vector) by concatenating texture fea-
tures (LBP-based) extracted in two color spaces (YCrCb
and HSV). Then, for each access video, a feature vector
is obtained as the average of the extracted features in each
frame. Finally, an SVM classifier with an RBF kernel (γ =
1/numfeatures) is trained for both systems.
4.2. Classical Evaluation
First of all, the face-PAD methods are evaluated with
two protocols well known to the community (Grandtest
and Cross-Dataset). The aim of the experiments is two-
fold. First, to test the selected algorithms on the aggregated
dataset and to provide a baseline for further comparisons.
Second, to take advantage of the capabilities of the GRAD-
GPAD framework to perform an in-depth analysis of the
two approaches. Initially, we evaluate the algorithms with
the Grandtest protocol.
Now, from the results in Table 3 we can easily observe
that the Color-based approach performs better in general.
Besides, the large difference, in both approaches, between
HTER and ACER, suggests the influence of some PAIs.
∗https://github.com/zboulkenafet
†https://gitlab.idiap.ch/bob/bob.pad.face/
HTER (%) ACER (%) APCER (%) BPCER (%)
Quality-Based 17.03 25.25 34.09 16.41
Color-Based 6.33 10.22 13.86 6.58
Table 3: Results for Grandtest protocol
In order to understand the source of the error regard-
ing the PAI, we have used the One-PAI protocol. As this
protocol has only one type of attack for testing, the re-
ported metric is HTER (equivalent to ACER for the single
case). The Quality-based face-PAD obtains better results
for replay (HTER = 10.22%) and mask attacks (HTER =
10.08%), compared with print attacks (HTER = 14.53%).
The color-based approach, on the contrary, has a slightly
more stable behavior with a better performance for mask
attacks (HTER = 2.90%), while print and replay attacks get
HTER values of 4.41% and 3.92% respectively.
Once we have clarified the strengths and weaknesses of
the two approaches in the aggregated dataset, it is time to
check their generalization capabilities. Table 4 represents
the results for leave-one-out Cross-Dataset protocol, where
the named dataset is used for testing the generalization of
the models and the nine remaining datasets are used for
training and tuning the algorithms.
Test HTER (%) ACER (%) APCER (%) BPCER (%)
CASIA-FASD 41.57 48.98 81.11 16.85
REPLAY-ATTACK 27.61 34.06 33.96 34.17
3DMAD 29.00 29.00 0.00 58.00
MSU-MFSD 31.11 46.66 46.66 46.66
REPLAY-MOBILE 26.89 28.19 34.37 22.02
HKBU 45.00 45.00 90.0 0.00
OULU-NPU 34.68 41.11 75.27 6.94
ROSE-YOUTU 37.88 45.81 42.40 49.22
SIW 31.97 48.40 53.07 43.74
CSMAD 40.51 40.51 10.20 70.83
(a) Results using the Quality-Based face-PAD
Test HTER (%) ACER (%) APCER (%) BPCER (%)
CASIA-FASD 15.45 16.75 17.78 15.73
REPLAY-ATTACK 25.11 33.35 31.25 35.44
3DMAD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MSU-MFSD 17.78 35.00 56.66 13.33
REPLAY-MOBILE 18.30 22.99 23.96 22.02
HKBU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OULU-NPU 34.27 37.78 72.22 3.33
ROSE-YOUTU 27.42 34.78 25.25 44.32
SIW 9.90 22.06 30.43 13.69
CSMAD 40.05 40.05 55.10 25.00
(b) Results using the Color-Based face-PAD
Table 4: Results for Cross-Dataset protocol
To extract realistic conclusions from the results of the
cross-dataset protocol, we have to take into account the
global parameters of each of the datasets (see Table 1).
From the experiments we observe that the Color-based
method generalizes consistently better in all the datasets
considered in the cross-dataset protocol. It even gets re-
markable results in 3DMAD and HKBU databases. The
common element between these two databases is that all at-
tacks are performed using rigid masks. It seems that the
Color-based method (texture features over different color
spaces) achieves fair performance for this type of attacks.
However, none of the methods generalizes properly in sce-
narios with different PAIs, as in all of them the ACER is
above 22%. In this classical protocol there are many fac-
tors that are involved in an uncontrolled way and, without
additional information, it is very complicated to draw fair
conclusions. It is therefore necessary to carry out evalua-
tions focusing on fewer parameters.
4.3. Proposed Evaluation: the new protocols
The proposed benchmark has three protocols that al-
low us to draw conclusions from another perspective: the
Cross-Devices protocol evaluates performance on unseen
capture devices; the Cross-FaceResolution protocol mea-
sures the effects of variations in face resolution; and the
Cross-Conditions protocol evaluates the influence of adver-
sarial operating conditions.
Table 5 shows the results of Quality-Based and Color-
Based approaches using the Cross-Device protocol, leaving
out one type of capture device (digital camera, webcam or
mobile/tablet as named in the table) for training and devel-
opment stages and using it on testing. Such results indicate
that the most challenging scenario for the two systems eval-
uated is Cross-Device-Webcam-Test. This result seems to be
closely related to the quality of the capture device, as we-
bcams have the worst image quality. We can conclude that
there is a drop in the performance of both face-PAD systems
as the image quality degrades. In addition, it can be appre-
ciated how, with this type of protocols, the Quality-based
method suffers much more than the Color-based one.
Cross-Device
Protocol HTER (%) ACER (%) APCER (%) BPCER (%)
Quality-Based
DigitalCamera-Test 24.85 52.27 86.67 17.89
Webcam-Test 28.55 53.57 29.52 47.62
MobileTablet-Test 21.11 25.76 29.33 22.19
Color-Based
DigitalCamera-Test 7.42 16.26 26.76 5.75
Webcam-Test 12.16 31.90 48.98 14.83
MobileTablet-Test 9.08 12.30 15.07 9.54
Table 5: Results for Cross-Device protocol
To compliment the study of capture devices, it is worth
to carry out another interesting experiment, taking into ac-
count the image resolution. Besides, if we also had the in-
formation of the resolution of the detected face available,
we could extract very interesting properties to figure out
the optimal distance for realistic scenarios. Results us-
ing the Cross-FaceResolution protocol are shown in Table
6. We can observe that the Color-based method on Cross-
FaceResoultion-LF-Test is the only experiment within this
protocol that seems to achieve good generalization capabil-
ities. In view of these results, it seems that there is a better
capacity for generalization when we move towards higher
resolution scenarios, having been trained with lower reso-
lution, than in the opposite case (for the Color-based face-
PAD).
Cross-FaceResolution
Protocol HTER (%) ACER (%) APCER (%) BPCER (%)
Quality-Based LF-Test 24.48 51.86 86.21 17.52SF-Test 29.98 48.79 50.00 47.58
Color-Based LF-Test 8.33 15.81 27.50 4.12SF-Test 25.47 29.62 12.20 47.04
Table 6: Results for Cross-FaceResolution protocol
If we analyze the results reported in both Table 5 and
Table 6, we can see that the most favorable case for the
color-based method occurs when we train using webcams
and digital cameras where the resolution of the detected
faces are medium and low, and testing on mobile or tablets
with a large face resolution. The results for the described
combination are an ACER of 51.77% for the Quality-based
method, while it is 39.07% in the case of Color-based. A
smaller number of samples for training (more filtering) and
a high dimensionality of the features can be the cause of this
drop in performance.
Finally, the results of the Cross-Condition protocol are
presented in Table 7. It seems that none of the baselines are
able to generalize in this protocol. Results indicate that the
working point shift is very large, reaching APCER values
close to or above 90%. This novel protocol is therefore pos-
tulated as one of the greatest challenges for the aggregated
dataset presented.
Cross-Conditions
Protocol HTER (%) ACER (%) APCER (%) BPCER (%)
Quality-Based Test-Adverse 36.62 40.48 72.50 8.46Test-Optimal 45.50 66.06 96.67 35.46
Color-Based Test-Adverse 41.13 45.43 86.25 4.61Test-Optimal 34.37 55.12 93.33 16.91
Table 7: Results for Cross-Conditions protocol
Through the experiments carried out, we have been able
to analyze two methods that achieve state-of-the-art results
when evaluated in individual databases and observe that,
however, they do not manage to generalize adequately in
conditions closer to real scenarios. But the information pro-
vided by the framework goes further, allowing us to system-
atically analyze the performance of such systems in the face
of other variations such as changes in capture devices, im-
age resolution or extreme mismatches between display con-
ditions. This allows for a fairer and more consistent evalua-
tion and comparison of face-PAD systems.
5. Conclusions
In this work we have proposed a framework, GRAD-
GPAD, for systematic evaluation of the generalization prop-
erties of face-PAD methods. The GRAD-GPAD framework
allows the aggregation of heterogeneous datasets, the inclu-
sion of new feature-extraction algorithms and new evalua-
tion protocols. We have studied the generalization capabili-
ties of two well-known face-PAD methods using a large ag-
gregated dataset comprising ten publicly available datasets,
and several protocols, including two new ones proposed in
this work. The GRAD-GPAD framework allows to learn
some deficiencies of these algorithms that could eventually
drive to more robust and generalized feature representations
for face-PAD. In short, this paper highlights the importance
of data and the necessity of fair evaluation methodologies to
improve the generalization of existing face-PAD methods.
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